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Abstract Economic theory suggests some ambiguity concerning the effects of
strengthening intellectual property rights (IPRs) on international trade. Here we
extend the empirical literature that attempts to resolve this ambiguity. We use panel
data to estimate a gravity equation for manufacturing exports, in aggregate and by
industry, from five advanced countries to 69 developed and developing countries
over the period 1970–1999. In particular, we use threshold regression techniques to
determine whether the impact of IPR protection on trade depends upon the level of
development, imitative ability and market size of the importing country. We con-
firm the importance of the importers’ imitative ability, and also find some evidence
of a role for market size in this relationship. The individual industries present
different patterns of thresholds and coefficients, with Total Manufacturing closely
reflecting that of Fabricated Metal Products.
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1 Introduction
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a
product of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of trade negotiations, reflects a growing
trend of linking trade policy and intellectual property rights (IPRs) regimes. The
stated aims of TRIPS, which sets minimum standards of IPR protection to be
provided by each World Trade Organisation (WTO) member, include encouraging
both innovation and international technology diffusion. The argument relating IPR
protection to innovation is clear. IPR protection provides innovators with the legally
enforceable power to prevent others from using an intellectual creation or to set the
terms on which it can be used. In the absence of such protection new technology or
knowledge is likely to be copied or imitated, thus lowering the potential profits of
the innovator and reducing the incentive for individuals to undertake innovative
activities. To the extent that innovation encourages economic growth, as suggested
by many endogenous growth models, we would also expect stronger IPR protection
to impact positively upon economic growth. Empirical evidence supporting a
relationship between IPRs and innovation has been found by Kanwar and Evenson
(2003); other evidence supports the existence of a positive relationship between
IPRs and economic growth (Gould and Gruben 1996; Falvey et al. 2004, 2006a).
The relationship between IPR protection and international technology diffusion
on the other hand is less straightforward. Technology may be diffused across
borders through a variety of formal and informal channels, including international
patenting, trade in goods, foreign direct investment (FDI), technology licensing, the
(temporary and permanent) migration of skilled workers and product imitation. In
addition to stronger IPR protection possibly affecting these potential channels in
opposing ways, often the relationship between IPR protection and a single channel
is not unambiguous, depending upon the level of development of the receiving
country and whether it is able to carry out significant technical innovation or imitate
existing technology. Several empirical studies have considered the relationship
between IPR protection and a particular channel of diffusion. Maskus and Penubarti
(1995) and Smith (1999) for example consider the relationship between IPRs and
trade, while Smarzynska (2004) and Eaton and Kortum (1996) consider the
importance of IPR protection for FDI and patenting respectively. Others (for
example, Maskus 1998; Smith 2001; Nicholson 2007) consider the impact of IPR
protection on multiple channels of diffusion simultaneously. The outcomes of these
studies are mixed, though stronger evidence is found for the importance of IPR
protection for trade and patenting than for FDI.1
A now large empirical literature supports the role of international trade in
transferring technology both among developed countries (for example, Coe and
Helpman 1995) and from developed to developing countries (for example, Coe et al.
1997). While issues remain to be resolved (Keller 2004) the evidence concerning
trade as a channel of technology diffusion is perhaps the most consistent of all of the
1 Even where the evidence indicates a relationship between IPR protection and a specific channel of
diffusion, it is often the case that there is little evidence of effective technology transfer. This is
particularly the case for FDI. See Falvey et al. (2006b) for a review of the impact of IPRs on the channels
of diffusion.
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potential channels. In this paper we concentrate on the importance of IPR protection
for international trade. Specifically, we examine the importance of IPR protection
for manufacturing exports from the G5 countries, in which the bulk of world
innovative activity [as measured by research and development (R&D) expenditure]
is conducted, to a sample of 69 developed and developing countries. To do this we
estimate a gravity equation using panel data grouped into six 5-year averages over
the period 1970–1999. Results are reported for both Total Manufacturing trade and
nine-two-digit ISIC industries. In addition to estimating a linear relationship
between IPR protection and trade, we examine whether this relationship depends
upon the level of development, imitative ability and market size of the importing
country using threshold regression techniques which allow us to estimate both the
number of regimes and their position.
Two opposing effects of stronger IPRs on a country’s imports have been
identified in the literature. Imports may expand with the curtailment of domestic
imitation, but may contract if exporters choose to exercise their increased market
power. The empirical literature to date has found evidence of both effects,
depending on the imitative ability of the importing country. Our results confirm the
prevalence of market expansion effects. We also find some evidence of market
power effects, but these are scattered and much less prevalent than previously
thought. Our investigation also highlights the importance of one industry
(Fabricated Metal Products) in determining the link between strengthened IPRs
and aggregate imports from these countries. The other industries behave in different
ways, implying that stronger IPRs will affect both the volume and composition of
these imports, although no clear link with industry R&D intensity is evident.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarises the theory and
evidence linking IPR protection to international trade. Section 3 describes our
empirical approach, while Sect. 4 discusses the data. Section 5 describes the results
and Sect. 6 summarises our results and offers some conclusions.
2 Background
Increased IPR protection in a country can directly impact on its imports in two
alternative ways. On the one hand, firms should be encouraged to export their goods
into foreign markets with strong IPR protection, since such protection reduces the
risk of piracy that can diminish the profitability of the firm’s activity in that country.
In this respect, stronger IPR protection would be expected to raise imports. On the
other hand, because stronger IPR protection reduces the ability of domestic firms to
imitate, it increases the market power of the exporter, which may encourage the
latter to act in a monopolistic manner by reducing sales. Maskus and Penubarti
(1995, p. 229) thus argue that there is a ‘‘trade-off between the enhanced market
power for the firm created by stronger patents and the larger effective market size
generated by reduced abilities of local firms to imitate the product’’. The ‘market
power’ effect would induce the foreign firm to export less to the domestic market,
while the ‘market expansion’ effect would shift the demand curve facing the firm
and encourage larger sales. Taylor (1993) also suggests that a third factor may be
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important for larger markets with significant imitative abilities, with stronger IPR
protection encouraging imports by reducing the need for firms to modify their
products to try to deter local imitation, thus reducing costs for exporting firms.
Maskus and Penubarti argue that the ‘market expansion’ effect is likely to
dominate in larger countries with strong imitative abilities, while the ‘market
power’ effect would dominate in smaller countries with weak imitative abilities.
Naturally the relative importance of these effects is also likely to depend on product
and market characteristics. Some products are easier to imitate than others, and
some products have closer substitutes than others. An insignificant effect of stronger
IPR protection on aggregated trade volumes could mask significant effects for some
individual industries. Hence our interest in also considering disaggregated trade
flows below. The impact of IPR protection on trade will also depend on the exporter.
If the latter is not an innovator, then imports from this country are less likely to
embody new technology and IPR protection should be relatively unimportant for
trade, hence our decision to concentrate on exports from those countries that are
important producers of new knowledge.
A further complication concerns a firm’s decision on its mode of serving a
foreign market. In general it faces three possibilities: it may export the good,
undertake FDI or license its intellectual asset to a foreign firm. The level of IPR
protection may affect the firm’s choice, and thus strong IPR protection might
diminish trade if it induces firms to choose to serve a foreign market by FDI or
licensing rather than exporting (Ferrantino 1993). But in the absence of reliable
panel data on FDI and licensing at a sufficiently disaggregated level for a large
enough group of countries we can do little about this.2
The observation that theory indicates the relationship between stronger IPR
protection and trade could have either sign, depending on product and market
characteristics, has lead to attempts to resolve this ambiguity empirically. In one of
the earliest explorations, Maskus and Penubarti (1995) use an augmented version of
the Helpman–Krugman model of monopolistic competition to estimate the effects of
patent protection on exports from 22 OECD countries to a sample of 71 countries in
1984. Their explanatory variables include the importers’ per capita GNP, a measure
of patent protection developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990), and the interaction
between this IPR index and dummies indicating whether the importing developing
country has a small or a large market, the latter accounting for market size effects
and technological capacity. Their results indicate that higher levels of IPR
protection have a positive impact on bilateral manufacturing imports into both small
and large developing economies, though the effects were statistically weaker in the
smaller economies. Whilst suggestive of the importance of technological capacity or
imitative ability for the relationship between IPR protection and trade, their results
find little support for a positive impact of IPR protection in the most patent sensitive
industries.
2 Nicholson (2007) uses data on the numbers of US firms undertaking FDI and licensing to investigate
how these activities are linked to IPRs and industry characteristics. He finds that firms in industries with
high capital costs are more likely to choose FDI where IPRs are weak, and firms in R&D intensive
industries are more likely to choose licensing when IPRs are strong.
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This approach is extended by Fink and Primo-Braga (2005) who estimate gravity
equations with either total non-fuel trade or ‘high-tech’ trade (a classification based
on Primo-Braga and Yeats 1992) as the dependent variable for a cross-section of
89 9 88 countries in 1989. High-tech trade is isolated in the expectation that the
effects of IPR protection should be stronger for knowledge-intensive trade. The
explanatory variables include standard gravity factors (the GDP and populations of
both trade partners, distance between trade partners and dummies for common
border, common language and membership of preferential trading arrangements)
plus a measure of IPR protection for the destination country developed by Ginarte
and Park (1997). They deal with the problem of zero trade flows by estimating two
equations, one for the probability of zero observations and the other for the
magnitude of positive trade flows. They find that stronger IPR protection has a small
but significantly positive impact on the probability that countries trade with each
other and a significantly positive impact on bilateral trade flows for both total non-
fuel imports and exports. But, contrary to expectations, stronger IPR protection is
found to have a significantly negative impact on the probability that two countries
trade in high-tech goods and no significant impact on bilateral high-tech trade flows.
This suggests the presence of a combination of strong market power effects and a
tendency for stronger IPR protection to induce producers of high-tech goods to
serve foreign markets by licensing or FDI rather than exports (see Greenaway and
Kneller 2007).
Considering exports from a large sample of innovating countries has the
advantage of allowing for the inclusion of exporter fixed effects. Concentrating on
exports from a single country, however, means that we need not be concerned that
the distribution of exports will also depend upon the trade stance of the exporting
country (Maskus 2000). Smith (1999) takes advantage of this feature by estimating a
gravity equation of exports in 1992 from each of the 50 US states plus the District of
Colombia to 96 countries for which the necessary data are available. Both the Rapp
and Rozek and Ginarte and Park indices of IPR protection are employed and yield
similar results. Smith begins by including interactions between the IPR measure and
four dummies based on the per capita income of the importer (high, upper-middle,
lower-middle, low). The results show that US exporters respond positively to the
strength of IPR protection in countries with lower-middle incomes, but negatively to
the strength of IPR protection in other countries. These results suggest that market
power effects dominate across countries where IPR protection approximates US
standards (high and upper-middle incomes) and across countries with weak
imitative abilities (low income countries). In contrast, strengthened IPR protection
in countries with weak IPR protection and strong imitative abilities (lower-middle
income countries) result in increased imports from the United States.
The importing countries are then divided into four groups depending on the threat
of imitation (defined according to the level of patent rights and R&D spending as a
percentage of GNP). Dummies for these four groups were then interacted with the
IPR variable. Smith finds a negative relationship between IPR protection and
imports from the United States for those countries with the weakest threat of
imitation, and a positive relationship for those with the strongest threat of imitation.
Overall, she concludes that US exports depend upon IPR protection in importing
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countries, but that the direction of the relationship depends on the threat of
imitation. Weak IPRs are a barrier to US exports, but only for countries that pose a
strong threat of imitation.
Rafiquzzaman (2002) carries out a similar analysis on Canadian manufactured
exports. Market expansion effects are found for countries with the strongest threat of
imitation, and some evidence of market power effects is found where the threat of
imitation is weakest. While the outcomes are broadly similar to those that Smith
found for the United States, the indications of market power effects are generally
weaker for Canadian exports.
Recently Co (2004) has extended this approach to a panel framework for a
sample of 71 countries over the period 1970–1992. Panel data allows one to take
account of changes in patent regimes and imitative ability over time, and better
controls for unmeasured heterogeneity. Once again the ratio of R&D to GNP is used
as a measure of imitative ability, here being interacted with the Ginarte and Park
IPR variable. She finds that IPR protection has a negative and significant impact on
US exports of non-R&D intensive goods, suggesting that market power effects
dominate for this trade, but no significant impact on R&D intensive goods, an
outcome similar to that found by Fink and Primo-Braga (2005) for high-tech trade.
The coefficients on the interaction between IPR protection and imitative ability are
found to be positive and significant for both types of goods, suggesting that the
impact of IPR protection depends upon the level of imitative ability, with increased
IPR protection having a positive impact on trade in all goods above a certain level of
imitative ability.3
In summary, the evidence from this small empirical literature supports the
following hypotheses (see also Fink and Maskus 2005). First, the level of IPR
protection does matter for at least some trade flows in manufactured goods.
Second, strengthening IPRs can lead to market power effects for some trade flows,
particularly for importing markets where the threat of imitation is small (due to a
small market, limited capacity for imitation or an existing high level of IPRs).
Third, strengthening IPRs can lead to market expansion effects for other trade
flows, particularly in importing markets with a significant threat of imitation.
Finally, the responsiveness of trade in R&D intensive products to increased IPR
protection may be difficult to predict, given that these products may be
particularly hard to imitate anyway, and that their producers can choose to serve
foreign markets through FDI and licensing. These hypotheses are among those
explored further below. Our particular point of departure is the observation that to
date the tests of hypotheses concerning the levels of IPR protection, market size
and imitative ability have relied on the division of the sample into groups based
3 Liu and Lin (2005) consider exports by Taiwan in three knowledge-intensive industries (semi-
conductor, information and communications equipment). For importing countries with a lower imitative
(R&D) ability than Taiwan, the results are analogous to those in the literature (i.e. market power effects in
countries with relatively low imitative ability and market expansion effects in the others). For importing
countries whose imitative ability exceeds Taiwan’s, there are market expansion effects but no market
power effects. In an interesting recent contribution, Ivus (2008) uses developing countries’ previous
colonial status and industry IPR-sensitivity to argue that the IPR strengthening under the TRIPS
agreement has led to increased high-tech imports by developing countries.
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on exogenous criteria with respect to both the number of groups and the location
of the thresholds that divide them. Recently developed threshold regression
techniques allow both the number and location of these thresholds to be
determined from the data rather than imposed. They also allow the number and
location of the thresholds to differ across industries.
3 Empirical analysis
We follow the literature in estimating a gravity equation to determine the impact of
IPR protection on the manufacturing imports of our sample of countries. While the
exact specification of the gravity equation can vary, our equation includes the GDPs
and populations of the importer and exporter, the distance between them and other
variables that may enhance or restrict trade. The starting point for our analysis is the
following equation
ln TRADEijt ¼ b1 ln DISTij þ b2 ln GDPMit þ b3 ln GDPXjt þ b4 ln POPMit
þ b5 ln POPXjt þ b7COMLANij þ b8COMBORij þ b9LOCKi
þ dIPRit þ li þ hj þ mt þ eijt ð1Þ
where i and j denote the importing and exporting country respectively, and t denotes
the time period, TRADE is exports from j to i in a particular category; DIST is the
great circle distance between the capitals; GDPM and POPM are the GDP and
population of the importing country; GDPX and POPX are the GDP and population
of the exporting country; COMLAN takes the value one if trading partners share a
common language; COMBOR takes the value one if the trading partners share a
common border; LOCK takes the value one if the importing country is landlocked;
IPR is our index of IPR protection in the importing country; li, hj and mt are importer,
exporter and time fixed effects; and eijt is a normally distributed error term.
We expect that, in line with existing literature (see Greenaway and Milner 2002)
distance will have a negative impact on trade flows by increasing transport costs.
The GDP’s of the importing and exporting country are expected to have a positive
impact on trade flows. In the former this is due to a higher GDP indicating a larger
market size, which should increase imports, while in the latter higher levels of GDP
represent higher productive capacity. There is some ambiguity over the expected
sign of the coefficients on population. In general, a larger population is usually
associated with a larger country size, which is likely to lead to more diversified
production and higher levels of self-sufficiency, and should lower trade flows and
imports in particular. A larger population also allows a country to take fuller
advantage of economies of scale leading to increased intra-industry trade (Prewo
1978). For an exporting country therefore, a larger population by encouraging
economies of scale would seem to imply larger manufacturing exports. A common
language should facilitate communication between trade partners and reduce the
search costs of international trade. A common language may reflect former colonial
ties, which for historical reasons may also lead to greater trade flows. A common
border facilitates trade, but being landlocked is generally considered to reduce
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international trade due to the relatively high cost of overland transportation. Finally,
while these are the expected coefficients for data on total trade we may expect
deviations from this when we consider industry data.
While the majority of studies using the gravity equation to predict trade flows
employ cross-section data, the use of panel data allows us to capture the relationship
between IPRs and trade over a longer period of time; to account for changing IPR
regimes and imitative ability; to control for the overall business cycle and to
disentangle the time-invariant country-specific effects (Egger 2000); and to control
for unmeasured country and time-specific heterogeneity (Co 2004). When using panel
data we need to make a choice between the fixed and the random effects estimator. Co
(2004) largely relies on a random effects model since with only one exporter a fixed
effects model would preclude the inclusion of time-invariant variables such as
distance and the common border dummy. Ma´tya´s (1997) and Egger (2000) argue that
where possible a three way fixed effects model (including importer, exporter and time-
specific fixed effects) should be estimated. Egger for example argues that since the
effects we seek to capture are trade policy and other export driving and impeding
‘environmental’ factors, including historical and geographical determinants which
tend not to be random, a fixed effects estimator is more appropriate. These fixed effects
are represented by li, hj and mt in the estimating equation above.
4
The estimate of coefficient d gives us a simple linear estimate of the impact that IPR
protection has on a country’s imports from our five developed countries. But, as
discussed above, there are reasons to believe that the relationship between IPR
protection and trade is non-linear, and in particular that it may depend upon the level of
development, imitative ability and the market size of the importing country. To test
these hypotheses we follow the general approach of Smith (1999) and Rafiquzzaman
(2002) of allocating countries into groups based on the relevant characteristic. But
rather than using a predetermined allocation as they do, we employ the threshold
techniques of Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000),5 which allow us to estimate rather than
impose both the number of regimes and the positioning of the splits.6
The Hansen method (see Appendix 1 for details) is based on a threshold
regression where observations fall into regimes that depend on an estimated value of
an observed variable (e.g. a measure of imitative ability). In the two-regime model,
for example, we have
4 A further issue is how to deal with zero trade flows. Using five-year averages did alleviate this problem
somewhat, but there were still a few cases where zero trade flows were reported. Several options are
available (Frankel 1997, chapter 6), but given that the threshold techniques that we employ below have
been developed for OLS we adopt the most straightforward ‘‘solution’’ of adding a small number to the
zero observations (equal to $100), which allows us to estimate the log-linear model.
5 Hansen (1999) in particular describes the threshold regression technique for panel data with fixed
effects.
6 The alternative hypothesis, tested by Co (2004), is that the marginal effect of IPR protection on trade is
a continuous (in fact linear) function of, say imitative ability, which is tested by including the appropriate
interactive term. The threshold and interactive approaches are not nested hypotheses, however, and it is
possible that each is valid for some industries. Where thresholds are estimated, but an interactive term is
more appropriate, we would expect to find a large number of significant thresholds with the coefficient on
IPR rising for higher regimes. If however we were to find only one or two significant thresholds, or
coefficients that change sign across regimes then the results would not support the interaction hypothesis.
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dIPRðTHitÞ ¼ d1IPRitIðTHit  kÞ þ d2IPRitIðTHit [ kÞ ð2Þ
where k is the estimated breakpoint or threshold. Here the observations are
separated into two regimes depending on whether the threshold variable, THit, is
smaller or larger than the value k. The impact of IPR protection on trade will be
given by d1 for countries in the low regime (i.e. THit B k) and by d2 for countries in
the high regime (i.e. THit [ k). We estimate the threshold (k) as the value that
minimises the concentrated sum of squared errors from the least squares regression.
In practice this involves searching over distinct values of the threshold variable
(THit) for the value of k that minimises the sum of squared errors. After obtaining a
value of k, we can estimate the parameters of our gravity equation. Having found
the threshold we identify whether it is statistically significant by testing the null
hypothesis that d1 = d2. Rejecting the null hypothesis allows us to conclude that a
threshold exists in the relationship between IPR and Trade. One complication is that
the threshold k is not identified under the null hypothesis, implying that classical
tests do not have standard distributions and critical values cannot be read off
standard distribution tables. We follow Hansen (1996) and bootstrap to obtain the p-
value for the test of a significant threshold.7
This technique can be extended to consider the possibility of more than one
threshold (i.e. more than two regimes). We decide upon the optimal number of
thresholds by first estimating a single threshold. If this is found to be significant, we
search for a second threshold using sequential estimation (see Appendix 1). If this
second estimated threshold is significant we search for a third threshold and so on.
As is common in the literature, we impose the restriction that at least 20% of
observations must lie in each regime to maintain a reasonable sample size in each.
This implies that the maximum number of regimes we can consider is five.
The data that we use and its sources are described in Appendix 2. We examine
manufacturing exports from the five largest developed countries to a sample of 69
other developed and developing countries.8 World R&D is concentrated in the
OECD countries,9 and within the OECD heavily concentrated in these five
countries.10 Table 1 (column 2) shows that in all industries the leading five countries
7 The bootstrap distribution of the test statistic was computed using 1,000 replications of the procedure
proposed in Hansen (1996).
8 The five exporting countries are France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The importing countries are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium-Luxemburg,
Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea (Republic of),
Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, the
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
9 UNIDO (2002) notes that the share of R&D financed by enterprises in advanced countries was 98% in
the 1980s and 94% in the 1990s.
10 The ANBERD database reports total manufacturing R&D expenditure for 15 OECD countries for
1973–1998, and the average share of R&D expenditure by these five economies over that period was
91.4%. There has been a slight decline in this share over the sample period from 92.8% in 1973 to 89.4%
in 1998.
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Table 1 Descriptive data on the significance of R&D and patents (percent)
Share of G5 in
total OECD R&D
expenditure
(1973–1998)a
Share of industry
R&D in total
manufacturing R&D
for G5 (1973–
1998)b
Ratio of
industry R&D
to production in
G5 (1978–
1996)c
Effectiveness
of patents
for product
innovations
(%)d
Industry
share of
manufacturing
exports (%)e
3—Total
Manufacturing
91.4 100 2.23 32.70 100
31—Food,
Beverages and
Tobacco (Food)
84.6 1.76 0.29 28.96 5.99
32—Textiles,
Apparel and
Leather
(Textiles)
90.1 0.55 0.24 27.69 5.10
33—Wood
Products and
Furniture
(Wood)
89.4 0.29 0.19 26.91 1.17
34—Paper, Paper
Products and
Printing (Paper)
83.9 0.94 0.28 24.51 2.85
35—Chemical
Products
(Chemicals)
89.5 20.04 2.53 37.79 17.97
36—Non-Metallic
Mineral
Products
(Non-Metallic)
93.1 1.25 0.98 28.83 1.58
37—Basic Metal
Industries
(Basic)
86.9 2.22 0.63 27.14 6.33
38—Fabricated
Metal Products
(Fabricated)
92.3 72.30 4.07 33.02 57.08
39—Other
Manufacturing
(Other)
88.9 0.63 0.65 25.71 1.84
a The figures in this column report the percentage of R&D expenditure in each industry carried out by the
leading five economies. Data is available over the period 1973–1998 for 15 OECD countries
b The figures in this column report the share of total manufacturing R&D expenditure that is spent in each of the
industries. The shares reported are the average shares over the period 1973–1998
c This column reports the ratio of industry R&D expenditure to industry production. The figures are averages
over the period 1978–1996 for the G5 countries. R&D data are expressed in current PPP US dollars. Production
data is expressed in current prices and in national currency. The production data was converted to US dollars,
using the PPP exchange rates provided in the STAN database. These PPP’s are based on a comparison of
consumer goods prices, and are neither industry-specific nor do they reflect relative producer prices. The
conversion of these industry-level production data to a common currency should be interpreted with caution
therefore
d This column reports results based on Table 1 of Cohen et al. (2000). Cohen et al. (2000) report results using
SITC rev. 3 at the four-digit level whereas we use SITC rev. 2 at the two-digit level. To calculate the figures at
the two-digit level we use the unweighted average of the four-digit results. Where a four-digit industry
according to SITC rev. 3 is allocated to two or more two-digit industries according to SITC rev. 2 we include the
industry in all of the two-digit industries
e The figures in this column refer to the average shares of exports from the G5 in each industry out of total
exports to our sample of importing countries over the period 1970–1999
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make up over 80% of total R&D spending by the 15 OECD countries for which we
have data. Also reported in Table 1 are the average industry shares in Total
Manufacturing R&D for the G5 countries over the period 1973–1998. It is clear from
these figures that R&D is heavily concentrated in two of the two-digit industries,
Chemicals and, particularly, Fabricated Metal. Column 4 of Table 1 reports the ratio
of industry R&D to industry production in our five exporting countries, with data
averaged over the period 1978–1996, to give an indication of their relative R&D
intensities. Once again Chemicals and Fabricated Metal tend to be the most R&D
intensive, with much smaller intensities found in the other industries. Since our IPR
index is a measure of patent strength, column 5 is a measure of the effectiveness of
patent protection for product innovations in the relevant industry.11 While the
dispersion in outcomes is much smaller than for the other indicators, we again see
that Chemicals and Fabricated Metal are the industries for which patent protection is
relatively important. The final column gives the share of each industry’s exports in
Total Manufacturing exports. Not unexpectedly given the figures in the previous
columns, exports from the G5 to our sample of importing countries are concentrated
in Fabricated Metals and, to a lesser extent, Chemicals. The predominance of the
former is reflected in the results that follow.
Finally, we explain our choices for threshold variables. As discussed above,
the literature points to the relationship between IPR protection and trade
depending upon an importer’s level of development, imitative ability and market
size. We measure an importer’s level of development by its GDP per capita.
Imitative ability refers to a country’s capacity to copy and produce technology
and goods produced elsewhere, and is likely to depend upon a range of factors.
Smith (1999) employs data on R&D expenditures as a percentage of GNP and
the level of IPR protection to split her sample into four groups. But this variable
has important limitations for our purposes. First, data is unavailable for many of
our countries and time periods, which is quite constraining in a panel context.12
Second, the reliability of the data that is available for developing countries has
been questioned.13 Third, even where it is accurately measured, R&D expendi-
tures are more likely to capture innovative than imitative activity. We therefore
turned to education level indicators, which are more widely available and were
also suggested by Smith, which gives us another check on the robustness of her
results. Here two alternatives are available—average years of secondary
schooling (SYR) and higher education (HYR) in the population over 15. We
use both below, but SYR is our preferred measure of imitative ability because we
expect that in general copying the embodied outcome of an innovation requires
lower skill levels than the innovation itself. HYR is likely to be a better indicator
11 This measure is derived from Cohen et al. (2000). The underlying data is from a survey questionnaire
administered to 1,478 R&D labs in US manufacturing in 1994. The question asked respondents to report
the percentage of their product innovations for which patents had been effective in protecting the firm’s
competitive advantage from those innovations.
12 Our observations fall from 2,021 to 1,360.
13 Maskus (2000, p. 118) observes that ‘‘in the developing economies R&D data are highly suspect and
not comparable to those in developed countries’’. He also notes that Smith’s designations of countries into
the four groups based on R&D data led to a number of anomalies.
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of innovative ability.14 The final threshold variable that we consider is the level
of GDP, as a measure of market size. We expect that the incentive to imitate will
be greater in larger markets, other things equal, but that firms in advanced
countries may take advantage of market power in smaller markets.
4 Results
4.1 A linear relationship
The results of estimating each regression separately using OLS with the IPR variable
included linearly are reported in Table 2.15 All variables are expressed in natural
logarithms (except for the dummies and the IPR variable). To ease interpretation we
report the results for the two-digit industries listed in descending order of their R&D
intensity. The results for the ‘core’gravity variables are broadly as anticipated, taking
into account our small number of exporters and that trade flows are more heavily
influenced by the comparative advantage factors picked up by the (unreported)
country dummies as we consider narrower industry definitions. We find a negative and
significant coefficient on distance. The coefficient on importer GDP is consistently
positive and significant, while the coefficient on the population of the importer is
negative and significant. Rather unexpectedly the exporter’s GDP often has a negative
coefficient when it is significant, but this seems to be largely a consequence of the
inclusion of fixed effects.16 The exporter’s population usually has a positive
coefficient when it is significant. While a common language appears to consistently
raise the level of imports across industries, the coefficient on the common border
dummy is found to vary in both sign and significance. Again this seems to be a
consequence of the inclusion of fixed effects.17 The coefficient on landlocked
sometimes shows ‘perverse’ signs for the same reason.
Turning to the IPR variable, we have significant positive coefficients for all
industries, with the exception of Textiles for which an insignificant positive coefficient
14 The view that secondary education is the broad key to development (shifting countries towards the
frontier) is supported by Meier (1995, p. 315) ‘‘the most critical manpower requirement tends to be for
people with a secondary education who can be managers, administrators, professional technicians or sub-
professional technical personnel’’. Similarly, Ramcharan (2004, p. 320) conjectures that ‘‘it may well be
that developing economies need only invest in secondary schooling, importing high-skilled education
embodied in the foreign goods’’.
15 We also estimated these equations as a system using seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) methods.
The SURE results are very similar to the OLS results and are available upon request, but for consistency
with the threshold results that we report later which rely on OLS estimates, we report the OLS estimates
in the text.
16 If we re-estimate excluding importer, exporter and time dummies, the size of the negative coefficients
on exporter GDP tends to fall significantly, and in many cases becomes significant and positive.
17 When fixed effects are excluded, the common border is more likely to be positive and significant for
the industries, but still negative for the most R&D intensive products. It should be remembered that while
we expect a common border to lead to greater trade flows in aggregate, this will not necessarily be the
case for each individual product. The negative coefficients may be an idiosyncrasy of the sample since the
number of common borders is limited and, with the exception of the US-Mexico border, involve trade
between advanced countries.
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is found. While we do not wish to make too much of these results, since this is not our
preferred specification, we note that there is no obvious relationship between the size of
the coefficient on IPRs and R&D intensity at the industry level, with the largest
coefficient on IPRs being found in Food. This illustrates an important point. Our IPR
index is that constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and is specifically based on the
strength of patent protection in the country concerned (see Appendix 2 for details).
While patent protection is particularly significant for R&D intensive industries, a
country with a strong patent regime is very likely to provide strong protection for all
forms of intellectual property. Certainly TRIPS defines rights across a wide spectrum.18
As a result we interpret the Ginarte and Park index as a general IPR index, and expect
that it may prove significant in industries where IPRs other than patents are important.
Were our investigations to cease at this point, we would conclude that
strengthening IPRs would raise exports to all countries, for all manufacturing
industries (except one) and would reduce exports in none. But our discussion of the
relevant theory and empirical literature indicated that the relationship between IPRs
and trade was very likely non-linear in form, with the impact of strengthening IPRs
likely to depend on product and importing country characteristics. The coefficients
estimated in the linear equation would then represent an ‘average’ effect, whose
literal interpretation could be quite misleading. Our threshold regression analysis
will demonstrate this.
4.2 Single variable thresholds
Our initial approach to examining the importance of third variables in the
relationship between IPR protection and trade is to estimate the optimal number of
thresholds for each of our three threshold variables in turn. For each threshold
variable we report the location of the significant thresholds (both the value and its
percentile location) and the coefficient and t-value on IPR protection for each of the
corresponding regimes, for each industry.19
4.2.1 Thresholds on the level of development
The results reported in Table 3 use the level of development of the importer
(specifically the natural log of GDP per capita) as the threshold variable.20 Our
major interest in these results lies in their implications for the impact of
strengthened IPR protection on the imports of developing countries. In recent
18 TRIPs includes agreements on the following forms of intellectual property; copyrights and related
rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated
circuits, and protection of undisclosed secrets.
19 For brevity and ease of presentation we choose not to report the coefficients on the other gravity
variables. These results are available upon request. The coefficients on the other gravity variables are
found to be remarkably consistent across the remaining tables, and are quite robust in terms of size, sign
and significance to the choice of threshold variable and the number of thresholds.
20 Note that in this table there are occasions in which the last estimated threshold was significant. In these
cases it was not possible to search for a further threshold whilst maintaining the restriction that 20% of
observations must lie in each regime. In these cases we report the results in Tables 4 and 5 based on the
last significant estimated threshold.
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years the latter have shown increased interest in WTO membership as a means of
gaining improved access to export markets. At the same time they have expressed
concern over the power to advanced country exporters they may concede in their
own markets through the accompanying TRIPS obligations. The estimation of
thresholds on GDP per capita should indicate the degree to which the existence and
strength of market power and market expansion effects are related to importers’
levels of development.
The first row in Table 3 shows that there are three significant thresholds for
Total Manufacturing, occurring at the 26th, 47th and 79th percentiles of GDP per
capita in the sample. This implies that there are four IPR regimes with similar
numbers of observations in each, and with IPR coefficients and t-statistics as
shown in the second row.21 The coefficient on the IPR index rises as one moves
up the regimes, but is only significantly positive in the upper two regimes. As
Table 3 Development thresholds (threshold variable: GDP per capita)
001050elitnecreP
Total Manufacturing 
Thres 
GDP/cap 
6.41*** 
(26th)   
7.36** 
(47th) 
9.41*** 
(79th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
–0.12 
(–1.18) 
0.10 
(1.19) 
0.20 
(2.89)*** 
0.31 
(4.03)*** 
Fabricated Metal 
Products 
Thres 
GDP/cap 
6.41*** 
(26th) 
7.36** 
(47th) 
9.41** 
(79th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
–0.13 
(–1.13) 
0.12 
(1.30) 
0.21 
(2.83)*** 
0.33 
(3.90)*** 
Chemical Products 
Thres 
GDP/cap 
6.41*** 
(26th) 
9.41** 
(79th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
0.03 
(0.31) 
0.23 
(2.81)*** 
0.36 
(4.08)*** 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals 
Thres 
GDP/cap 
6.41*** 
(26th) 
7.96** 
(60th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
–0.1 
(–0.77) 
0.15 
(1.57) 
0.29 
(2.93)*** 
Other 
Manufacturing 
Thres 
GDP/cap 
6.41*** 
(26th) 
8.57* 
(71st) 
Coeff 
IPR 
–0.17 
(–1.09) 
0.16 
(1.34) 
0.32 
(2.60)*** 
Basic Metal 
Industries 
Thres 
GDP/cap 
6.41*** 
(26th) 
7.92*** 
(58th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
–0.26 
(–1.63) 
0.22 
(1.80)* 
0.42 
(3.50)*** 
Food, Beverages, 
Tobacco 
Thres 
GDP/cap 
6.41*** 
(26th) 
7.44* 
(48th) 
8.56*** 
(71st) 
Coeff 
IPR 
–0.07 
(–0.47) 
0.18 
(1.41) 
0.30 
(2.73)*** 
0.58 
(4.85)*** 
Paper, Paper 
Products, Printing 
Thres 
GDP/cap 
6.41*** 
(26th) 
7.96** 
(60th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
–0.06 
(–0.47) 
0.16 
(1.56) 
0.30 
(2.99)*** 
Textiles, Apparel, 
Leather 
Thres 
GDP/cap 
6.41*** 
(26th) 
7.68** 
(53rd) 
Coeff 
IPR 
–0.43 
(–2.40)** 
0.06 
(0.42) 
0.25 
(2.17)** 
Wood Products, 
Furniture 
Thres 
GDP/cap 
6.41*** 
(26th) 
7.73*** 
(54th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
–0.15 
(–0.80) 
0.12 
(0.81) 
0.37 
(2.94)*** 
For each industry group, this table reports the position of the estimated thresholds and their significance
(first row) and the estimated coefficient on the IPR variable for each regime and its significance (second
row). The coefficients on the remaining variables from the gravity model (including importer, exporter
and time effects) are not reported for brevity
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. t-statistics in parentheses are
based on White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The significance of the estimated
thresholds is found using the bootstrap procedure of Hansen (1996) with 1,000 replications
21 The thresholds are marked in italics and are located horizontally in this and the following two tables so
as to give a rough indication of their relative location across industries.
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expected the significant coefficient in the linear case is contained within the range
of these coefficients, and is larger than the two smaller (and insignificant)
coefficients, and smaller than the two larger (and significant) coefficients. These
results indicate that it is only in more developed countries that strengthening IPRs
will raise manufacturing imports in aggregate. The results for Fabricated are
almost an exact reflection of those for Manufacturing, a pattern that we will see
repeated below. The only other industry with three significant thresholds is Food,
which has a similar pattern of significance of coefficients, though these are all
larger. The remaining industries have two significant thresholds. In all cases the
IPR coefficient increases as we move to higher income regimes, and the
coefficients are always positive and significant in the highest regimes. All
industries have a significant threshold at the 26th percentile of GDP per capita
(corresponding to the GDP per capita of Senegal in 1975). All bar one
(Chemicals) have a negative coefficient in the lowest regime, but only for Textiles
is this coefficient significant. Recall that this industry was the only industry for
which the coefficient on IPRs was not significant in the linear regression. Here
this is explained as the average of significant market power effects in countries
with the lowest levels of development and significant market expansion effects in
countries with the highest levels of development.
Table 4 Imitative ability thresholds (threshold variable: average years of secondary schooling)
001050elitnecreP
Total Manufacturing 
Thres 
SYR 
1.56** 
(65th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.13 
(1.98)** 
0.20 
(2.89)***
Fabricated Metal 
Products 
Thres 
SYR 
1.56*** 
(65th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.14 
(1.85)* 
0.23 
(2.92)***
Chemical Products 
Thres 
SYR 
1.96* 
(75th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
0.20 
(2.47)** 
0.27 
(3.32)***
Non-Metallic 
Minerals 
Thres 
SYR 
0.56* 
(26th)
1.56*** 
(65th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.08 
(0.83) 
0.14 
(1.53)
0.26 
(2.69)***
Other Manufacturing 
Thres 
SYR 
1.56*** 
(65th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.11 
(0.97) 
0.26 
(2.26)**
Basic Metal 
Industries 
Thres 
SYR 
0.5** 
(21st)
0.97* 
(44th)
1.56* 
(65th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.13 
(1.07) 
0.27 
(2.30)**
0.20 
(1.60)
0.29 
(2.37)**
Food, Beverages, 
Tobacco 
Thres 
SYR 
0.59** 
(28th)
1.2* 
(52nd)
1.95* 
(75th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.26 
(2.27)** 
0.35 
(3.33)***
0.42 
(3.87)***
0.49 
(4.55)***
Paper, Paper 
Products, Printing 
Thres 
SYR 
0.7** 
(34th)
1.56** 
(65th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.11 
(1.09) 
0.19 
(1.96)*
0.28 
(2.84)***
Textiles, Apparel, 
Leather 
Thres 
SYR 
0.5* 
(25th)
1.21*** 
(52nd)
1.95* 
(75th)
Coeff 
IPR 
–0.01 
(–0.08) 
0.09 
(0.70)
0.26 
(2.09)**
0.35 
(2.77)***
Wood Products, 
Furniture 
Thres 
SYR 
1.56** 
(65th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.13 
(1.04) 
0.39 
(3.05)***
See Table 3
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Smith (1999) and Rafiquzzaman (2002) also examine the links between the
impact of a stronger IPR regime and the importer’s level of development. They do
this by dividing the importing countries into groups based on income per capita and
including dummy variables for each group interacted with the IPR variable. Smith
finds market expansion effects for the lower middle income group and market power
effects for the other three in Manufacturing. The industries exhibit a similar pattern.
Rafiquzzaman finds market expansion effects at all income levels for Manufactur-
ing, but some evidence of market power effects, mainly in the low income group,
for some industries. Interestingly, our threshold analysis indicates the same number
of regimes (four) as Smith for Manufacturing, though in different locations. But as
Tables 4 and 5 indicate, four is not the appropriate number of regimes for the
majority of industries. Once this is taken into account significant market power
effects are much less in evidence.
What do our results imply about TRIPS and the imports of developing countries?
For the relatively more advanced developing countries—those countries above the
47th percentile of income per capita in our sample—strengthening their IPR regimes
will increase Total Manufacturing imports from our five advanced exporters.
Table 3 shows that similar thresholds exist for the two-digit manufacturing
industries. For these countries there is the prospect of increased technology
Table 5 Imitative ability thresholds (threshold variable: average years of higher schooling)
001050elitnecreP
Total 
Manufacturing 
Thres 
HYR 
0.098** 
(47th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.14 
(2.11)** 
0.21 
(2.99)***
Fabricated 
Metal 
Products 
Thres 
HYR 
0.099*** 
(47th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.16 
(2.14)* 
0.23 
(2.89)***
Chemical 
Products 
Thres 
HYR 
Coeff 
IPR 
0.23 
(2.86)***
Non-Metallic 
Minerals 
Thres 
HYR 
0.099* 
(47th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.16 
(1.73)* 
0.22 
(2.35)**
Other 
Manufacturing 
Thres 
HYR 
0.175*** 
(62nd)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.16 
(1.35) 
0.22 
(1.95)*
Basic Metal 
Industries 
Thres 
HYR 
0.027* 
(22nd)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.20 
(1.69)* 
0.31 
(2.62)***
Food, 
Beverages, 
Tobacco 
Thres 
HYR 
0.076* 
(42nd)
0.175*** 
(62nd)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.25 
(2.38)** 
0.32 
(2.95)***
0.43 
(4.06)***
Paper, Paper 
Products, 
Printing 
Thres 
HYR 
Coeff 
IPR 
0.20 
(2.08)**
Textiles, 
Apparel, 
Leather 
Thres 
HYR 
0.099*** 
(47th)
Coeff 
IPR 
0.10 
(0.81)
0.22 
(1.82)*
Wood 
Products, 
Furniture 
Thres 
HYR 
0.036* 
(25th)
0.175*** 
(62nd) 
Coeff 
IPR 
0.24 
(1.75)* 
0.13 
(0.98) 
0.29 
(2.26)** 
See Table 3
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diffusion through commodity trade. But for the least developed countries,
specifically those below the 26th percentile, strengthening their intellectual property
regimes will not increase imports from advanced countries, and indeed will likely
reduce them in Textiles. For these countries the prospect of assuming the full TRIPS
obligations would appear unattractive. Fortunately many of them can obtain access
for their exports under alternative schemes [e.g. through the generalized system of
preferences (GSP)].
4.2.2 Thresholds on imitative ability
Table 4 performs the same analysis using our preferred measure of imitative
ability (SYR) as the threshold variable. In this case we expect to observe market
expansion effects for countries with high levels of imitative ability, with the
possibility of market power effects for those countries with little ability to imitate
advanced technology. Manufacturing has one significant threshold and IPRs have
a significant positive coefficient in each regime, but larger in the higher regime.
This outcome matches that for Fabricated and Chemicals, though the latter’s
threshold is at a higher level. The other industries show a variety of outcomes,
with one to three thresholds. There is only one negative coefficient, and that is
insignificant, so there is no evidence of market power effects associated with
imitative ability. With one exception (Basic) all coefficients are increasing,
positive if significant and either always significant or significant in the higher
regimes. There is thus clear evidence that strengthening IPRs increases trade, at
least above some level of imitative ability, and that this effect is stronger at higher
levels of imitative ability.
Table 5 reports the equivalent outcomes using HYR as a measure of imitative
ability. These are very similar to those for SYR. Manufacturing has one significant
threshold and IPR has a significant positive coefficient in each regime, but larger in
the higher regime. Again this outcome mirrors that for Fabricated. Industries have
the same number or fewer significant thresholds as for SYR, with one exception
(Wood), and all have at least one significant coefficient on IPR. Again higher
regimes have higher coefficients, with the exception of Wood, providing clear
evidence that strengthening IPRs increases trade, at least above some threshold, and
that this effect is stronger at higher levels of HYR. Given the similarity in results
between SYR and HYR, we report only results for our preferred measure (SYR)
when we consider dual thresholds in the next section.
4.2.3 Thresholds on market size
Table 6 reports the results for market size (GDP) thresholds. Here our interest is in
whether we find a pattern of market power effects in small markets and market
expansion effects in large markets. Again this is a case where the results for
Manufacturing exports and Fabricated exports are very similar. Both show two
thresholds and similar coefficients in the three regimes they generate. The market
power effect shown for Manufacturing at small market sizes primarily reflects that
for Fabricated. While other industries have negative coefficients over this range they
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are not significant. Three other industries have two significant thresholds, Food has
three and the others one. For Manufacturing and Fabricated all coefficients are
significant in all regimes and positive and increasing for the larger market sizes.
This pattern of increasing coefficients, significant for the larger market sizes is
present in four other industries. For two of the remainder there is a significant
positive effect only for larger market sizes. A third is positive and significant
throughout, but declining, and the last is positive and significant only for the largest
and smallest market sizes.
In summary, the results in Tables 4, 5 and 6 confirm that the strength of
importer’s IPRs is a significant determinant of its manufacturing imports from our
five advanced countries. This is evident in Manufacturing exports, and to a greater
or lesser degree in the exports of individual Manufacturing industries, though it
seems that Fabricated most closely matches the aggregate behaviour. We find no
significant market power effects associated with imitative ability, and those
associated with a small market size at the aggregate level reflect those in Fabricated
only. Market expansion effects are pervasive at higher levels of imitative ability,
and are also evident when we consider market sizes, tending to be stronger in larger
markets in most industries.
Table 6 Market size thresholds (threshold variable: GDP)
Percentile 001050
Total 
Manufacturing 
Thres 
GDP 
22.18*** 
(21st) 
24.91** 
(65th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
-0.17 
(-3.02)*** 
0.14 
(1.93)* 
0.22 
(3.20)*** 
Fabricated 
Metal 
Products 
Thres 
GDP 
22.18*** 
(21st) 
24.91** 
(65th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
-0.22 
(-3.48)*** 
0.15 
(1.91)* 
0.24 
(3.20)*** 
Chemical 
Products 
Thres 
GDP 
22.82** 
(38th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
0.36 
(3.64)*** 
0.22 
(2.76) 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals 
Thres 
GDP 
22.18*** 
(21st) 
25.79** 
(79th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
-0.12 
(-1.11) 
0.14 
(1.49) 
0.25 
(2.73)*** 
Other 
Manufacturing 
Thres 
GDP 
24.37*** 
(53rd) 
Coeff 
IPR 
0.31 
(2.52)** 
0.12 
(1.06) 
Basic Metal 
Industries 
Thres 
GDP 
22.15*** 
(20th) 
25.81** 
(79th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
-0.05 
(-0.36) 
0.21 
(1.81)* 
0.37 
(3.22)*** 
Food, 
Beverages, 
Tobacco 
Thres 
GDP 
22.15*** 
(20th) 
23.44* 
(46th) 
25.37*** 
(72nd) 
Coeff 
IPR 
-0.19 
(-1.16) 
-0.03 
(-0.21) 
0.35 
(3.13)*** 
0.54 
(5.15)*** 
Paper, Paper 
Products, 
Printing 
Thres 
GDP 
22.48* 
(29th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
0.27 
(2.53)** 
0.19 
(1.98)** 
Textiles, 
Apparel, 
Leather 
Thres 
GDP 
23.02*** 
(41st) 
Coeff 
IPR 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
0.23 
(1.96)* 
Wood 
Products, 
Furniture 
Thres 
GDP 
22.8*** 
(38th) 
25.11** 
(66th) 
Coeff 
IPR 
0.43 
(2.78)*** 
0.19 
(1.45) 
0.36 
(2.71)*** 
See Table 3
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4.3 Dual variable thresholds
In this section we explore the possibility of interactions between different threshold
variables. Specifically, we examine whether the relationship between strengthening
IPRs and trade depends upon the interaction between imitative ability (as measured
by SYR) and both the level of IPR protection and market size. The approach we
adopt involves three steps. First we take the highest significant threshold on
secondary schooling from Table 4 to distinguish between low and high imitative
ability.22 We then search for a second threshold based on either GDP or the level of
IPRs in the high imitative ability regime, and finally we search for a third threshold
based on the level of GDP or IPRs in the low imitative ability regime. When
estimating the third threshold we include the second threshold if it was found to be
significant (see Appendix 1 for details). The final equation (where all thresholds are
significant) is therefore
ln TRADEijt ¼ bkXikt þ d1IPRitIðSYRit  k1;Zit  k2Þ þ d2IPRitIðSYR k1;Zit [ k2Þ
þ d3IPRitIðSYRit [k1;Zit  k2Þ þ d4IPRitIðSYRit [ k1;Zit [ k2Þ
þ li þ hj þ mt þ eijt ð3Þ
where Zit is either the level of IPR protection or the natural log of the level of GDP.
4.3.1 Thresholds on imitative ability and market size
Intellectual property rights should matter more in countries where imitation is
likely, and both high imitative ability (as measured by an educated workforce) and
a large market size (as measured by the level of GDP) make imitation more likely,
in the latter case due to a large market making successful imitation more
profitable. Is it the case, as Maskus and Penubarti (1995) suggest, that market
expansion effects dominate in larger countries with stronger imitative abilities,
while market power effects dominate in smaller countries with weaker imitative
abilities? Table 7 reports our results. In the high imitative ability regime the
coefficients are positive and significant for all market sizes (except the small
market size for Wood). The coefficients are increasing in market size for
Manufacturing exports and for six of the industries, and the coefficients are
independent of market size for the other three. There is thus clear evidence of
market expansion effects, increasing in market size, in countries with high
imitative ability. In contrast, the results in the low imitative ability regime are less
clear cut. There are no significant effects for Manufacturing exports. The only
evidence of market power effects is in other in small markets. Elsewhere there is
evidence of market expansion effects for both small and large market sizes for one
industry (Food), for small markets only for three (Chemicals, Paper and Textiles)
and for large markets only for another three (Fabricated, Basic and Wood). The
coefficients are greater in larger markets in five industries, and lower in four.
Clearly there is little evidence of market power effects, and while market
22 We can only deal with one threshold for imitative ability, and the highest thresholds take just two
values, 1.56 for total manufacturing and 6 of the industries, and 1.95/6 for the other three industries.
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Table 7 Imitative ability and market size
Low imitative ability High imitative ability
Small market Large market Small market Large market
d1 d2 d3 d4
Total Manufacturing
Thres SYR B 1.56
GDP B 22.11
SYR B 1.56
GDP [ 22.11
SYR [ 1.56
GDP B 26.25
SYR [ 1.56
GDP [ 26.25
Coeff IPR -0.05 (-0.63) 0.11 (1.52) 0.15 (2.00)** 0.26 (3.52)***
Fabricated Metal Products
Thres SYR B 1.56
GDP B 22.11
SYR B 1.56
GDP [ 22.11
SYR [ 1.56
GDP B 26.3
SYR [ 1.56
GDP [ 26.3
Coeff IPR -0.07 (-0.77) 0.14 (1.84)* 0.20 (2.69)*** 0.25 (3.24)***
Chemical Products
Thres SYR B 1.96
GDP B 22.82
SYR B 1.96
GDP [ 22.82
SYR [ 1.96
GDP B 26.42
SYR [ 1.96
GDP [ 26.42
Coeff IPR 0.27 (2.90)*** 0.12 (1.51) 0.18 (2.24)** 0.33 (3.72)***
Non-Metallic Minerals
Thres SYR B 1.56
GDP B 22.17
SYR B 1.56
GDP [ 22.17
SYR [ 1.56
GDP B 25.88
SYR [ 1.56
GDP [ 25.88
Coeff IPR -0.12 (-1.15) 0.10 (1.09) 0.17 (1.85)* 0.29 (3.04)***
Other Manufacturing
Thres SYR B 1.56
GDP B 21.20
SYR B 1.56
GDP [ 21.20
SYR [ 1.56
GDP B 25.82
SYR [ 1.56
GDP [ 25.82
Coeff IPR -0.59 (-1.66)* 0.12 (1.07) 0.27 (2.33)** 0.27 (2.33)**
Basic Metal Industries
Thres SYR B 1.56
GDP B 22.11
SYR B 1.56
GDP [ 22.11
SYR [ 1.56
GDP B 26.20
SYR [ 1.56
GDP [ 26.20
Coeff IPR -0.08 (-0.64) 0.20 (1.74)* 0.24 (2.06)** 0.34 (2.91)***
Food, Beverages, Tobacco
Thres SYR B 1.95
GDP B 21.14
SYR B 1.95
GDP [ 21.14
SYR [ 1.95
GDP B 24.69
SYR [ 1.95
GDP [ 24.69
Coeff IPR 1.01 (2.81)*** 0.27 (2.54)*** 0.21 (1.84)*** 0.39 (3.73)***
Paper, Paper Products, Printing
Thres SYR B 1.56
GDP B 22.48
SYR B 1.56
GDP [ 22.48
SYR [ 1.56
GDP B 24.29
SYR [ 1.56
GDP [ 24.29
Coeff IPR 0.22 (2.09)** 0.10 (0.98) 0.22 (2.21)** 0.22 (2.21)**
Textiles, Apparel, Leather
Thres SYR B 1.56
GDP B 22.00
SYR B 1.56
GDP [ 22.00
SYR [ 1.56
GDP B 25.88
SYR [ 1.56
GDP [ 25.88
Coeff IPR 0.27 (1.89)* 0.03 (0.26) 0.22 (1.81)* 0.22 (1.81)*
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expansion effects are common, they are almost equally split between large and
small markets. In general, it seems that market size has an ambiguous impact on
the relationship between IPR and trade for countries with low imitative ability, but
that for countries with high levels of imitative ability market expansion effects
tend to be larger in countries with large markets.
4.3.2 Thresholds on imitative ability and IPR protection
Here we follow the standard approach in the literature, originating with Smith
(1999), of splitting the sample into four groups based on both the level of IPR
protection and imitative ability. This reflects the view that, although high imitative
ability will make imitation more likely, this can be countered by high levels of IPR
protection that reduces the threat of imitation. We re-examine this hypothesis using
an alternative measure of imitative ability (schooling rather than R&D spending)
and a broader sample of exporting countries, as well as allowing the thresholds on
both variables to be determined endogenously and to vary across industries.
We have evidence that stronger IPRs are more important when imitative ability is
high from Sect. 4.2.2. We now consider discontinuities in this relationship. Our
results are presented in Table 8. Consider first the regimes where imitative ability is
low. Here there is clear evidence that strengthening IPRs beyond a threshold (which
is industry specific) will not affect imports from these advanced countries. For all
industries (except Food) the coefficient on IPRs is not statistically significant in the
higher IPR range. This is largely as expected; countries in the high IPR regime have
a lower threat of imitation, suggesting that market expansion effects may be limited.
Table 7 continued
Low imitative ability High imitative ability
Small market Large market Small market Large market
d1 d2 d3 d4
Wood Products, Furniture
Thres SYR B 1.56
GDP B 25.74
SYR B 1.56
GDP [ 25.74
SYR [ 1.56
GDP B 23.53
SYR [ 1.56
GDP [ 23.53
Coeff IPR 0.02 (0.12) 0.32 (2.21)** 0.21 (1.28) 0.44 (3.42)***
The results in this table are for the interactions between two threshold variables. Observations are split
into a low and high imitative ability regime based on the highest SYR threshold from Table 6. Thresholds
are then calculated based on the level of GDP in both the low and the high imitative ability regimes,
giving a possible number of four regimes. In some cases no significant threshold on GDP is found for the
high imitative ability regime, with the coefficient reported being that from assuming no threshold in the
high imitative ability regime. The first row for each industry reports the estimated thresholds on both SYR
and GDP, while the second reports the estimated coefficients on the IPR variable and their significance.
The coefficients on the remaining variables from the gravity model (including importer, exporter and time
effects) are not reported for brevity
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively. t-statistics in parentheses are
based on White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The significance of the estimated
thresholds is found using the bootstrap procedure of Hansen (1996) with 1,000 replications
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Table 8 Imitative ability and intellectual property rights
Low imitative ability High imitative ability
Low IPRs High IPRs Low IPRs High IPRs
d1 d2 d3 d4
Total Manufacturing
Thres SYR B 1.56
IPR B 3.27
SYR B 1.56
IPR [ 3.27
SYR [ 1.56
IPR B 2.95
SYR [ 1.56
IPR [ 2.95
Coeff IPR 0.30 (3.70)*** 0.09 (1.18) 0.37 (4.25)*** 0.23 (3.20)***
Fabricated Metal Products
Thres SYR B 1.56
IPR B 3.27
SYR B 1.56
IPR [ 3.27
SYR [ 1.56
IPR B 2.95
SYR [ 1.56
IPR [ 2.95
Coeff IPR 0.28 (3.12)*** 0.09 (1.08) 0.36 (3.87)*** 0.25 (3.12)***
Chemical Products
Thres SYR B 1.96
IPR B 2.41
SYR B 1.96
IPR [ 2.41
SYR [ 1.96
IPR B 3.31
SYR [ 1.96
IPR [ 3.31
Coeff IPR -0.29 (-2.25)** -0.07 (-0.78) -0.06 (-0.59) 0.08 (0.95)
Non-metallic minerals
Thres SYR B 1.56
IPR B 3.18
SYR B 1.56
IPR [ 3.18
SYR [ 1.56
IPR B 2.95
SYR [ 1.56
IPR [ 2.95
Coeff IPR 0.29 (2.74)*** 0.07 (0.63) 0.39 (3.52)*** 0.28 (2.91)***
Other Manufacturing
Thres SYR B 1.56
IPR B 2.67
SYR B 1.56
IPR [ 2.67
SYR [ 1.56
IPR B 2.56
SYR [ 1.56
IPR [ 2.56
Coeff IPR -0.06 (-0.49) 0.08 (0.74) 0.18 (1.52) 0.18 (1.52)
Basic Metal Industries
Thres SYR B 1.56
IPR B 2.41
SYR B 1.56
IPR [ 2.41
SYR [ 1.56
IPR B 3.35
SYR [ 1.56
IPR [ 3.35
Coeff IPR -0.17 (-1.22) 0.03 (0.24) 0.05 (0.46) 0.16 (1.43)
Food, Beverages, Tobacco
Thres SYR B 1.95
IPR B 3.24
SYR B 1.95
IPR [ 3.24
SYR [ 1.95
IPR B 2.89
SYR [ 1.95
IPR [ 2.89
Coeff IPR 0.53 (4.66)*** 0.29 (2.64)*** 0.68 (5.50)*** 0.45 (4.24)***
Paper, Paper Products, Printing
Thres SYR B 1.56
IPR B 3.36
SYR B 1.56
IPR [ 3.36
SYR [ 1.56
IPR B 2.91
SYR [ 1.56
IPR [ 2.91
Coeff IPR 0.19 (1.98)** -0.07 (-0.53) 0.26 (2.73)*** 0.26 (2.73)***
Textiles, Apparel, Leather
Thres SYR B 1.56
IPR B 3.36
SYR B 1.56
IPR [ 3.36
SYR [ 1.56
IPR B 2.93
SYR [ 1.56
IPR [ 2.93
Coeff IPR 0.24 (1.90)* -0.12 (-0.77) 0.44 (3.24)*** 0.27 (2.26)**
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Unlike Smith (1999) however, we find little evidence of market power effects for
this regime. In the low IPR regime we find the coefficient on IPRs to be significant
in all industries (except other and Basic). For Manufacturing and five industries
there is evidence of market expansion effects in this regime. For two industries there
is evidence of significant market power effects. We conclude that countries with
limited imitative ability will find that strengthening their IPR regimes will initially
increase manufacturing imports from these five countries, but that this will be
accompanied by a shift in the composition of these imports, away from those
industries with significant market power effects towards those with significant
market expansion effects. Once the IPR regime becomes sufficiently strong,
however, further strengthening will leave imports unaffected (except for Food).
A clear pattern also emerges for countries with high imitative abilities. For those
industries exhibiting market power effects when imitative ability is low, strength-
ening IPRs generally has no significant effect when imitative ability is high. For
those industries exhibiting market expansion effects when imitative ability is low,
strengthening IPRs also has market expansion effects when imitative ability is high,
though this effect is invariably weaker in the higher IPR regime (except for Paper
where the effects are the same), reflecting the smaller threat of imitation. In general,
countries with high imitative ability will find that strengthening their IPR regime
leads to increased Manufacturing imports, with similar shifts in the broad
composition of these imports occurring as for countries with low imitative ability,
since the same industries expand for both low and high imitative ability.
These outcomes broadly support previous results, except that there is far less
evidence of market power effects. There are two other noteworthy aspects of these
Table 8 continued
Low imitative ability High imitative ability
Low IPRs High IPRs Low IPRs High IPRs
d1 d2 d3 d4
Wood Products, Furniture
Thres SYR B 1.56
IPR B 2.70
SYR B 1.56
IPR [ 2.70
SYR [ 1.56
IPR B 2.54
SYR [ 1.56
IPR [ 2.54
Coeff IPR -0.43 (-2.64)*** -0.06 (-0.48) -0.21 (-1.15) 0.09 (0.66)
The results in this table are for the interactions between two threshold variables. Observations are split
into a low and high imitative ability regime based on the highest SYR threshold from Table 6. Thresholds
are then calculated based on the level of IPRs in both the low and the high imitative ability regimes,
giving a possible number of four regimes. In some cases no significant threshold on IPRs is found for the
high imitative ability regime, with the coefficient reported being that from assuming no threshold in the
high imitative ability regime. The first row for each industry reports the estimated thresholds on both SYR
and IPRs, while the second reports the estimated coefficients on the IPR variable and their significance.
The coefficients on the remaining variables from the gravity model (including importer, exporter and time
effects) are not reported for brevity
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. t-statistics in parentheses are
based on White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The significance of the estimated
thresholds is found using the bootstrap procedure of Hansen (1996) with 1,000 replications
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outcomes. The first is the separation of the two-digit industries into two groups—
those exhibiting market power effects and those exhibiting market expansion
effects. The second is that this separation bears no obvious relationship to an
industry’s R&D intensity.
Finally, are these results consistent with the argument that the coefficients on
IPRs should decline as we move away from regimes with the greatest threat of
imitation? Intuitively, countries with high imitative ability and low IPR protection
provide the greatest threat of imitation, and those with low imitative ability and high
IPR protection offer the least. Countries with high imitative ability and high IPR
protection and countries with low imitative ability and low IPR protection are
somewhere in between. Do our estimated IPR coefficients decline in this way? The
answer is yes for those industries that exhibit market expansion effects, but there is
no consistent pattern for those that exhibit market power effects.
5 Summary and conclusions
The theoretical ambiguity concerning the effects of strengthening IPRs on imports
has been much emphasised in the literature and has led to several attempts at its
empirical resolution. The general conclusions that have emerged are that imitative
ability and, to a lesser extent, market size are important in this relationship, with
strong evidence of market expansion effects in countries with high imitative ability
and larger markets, and rather weaker evidence of market power effects in countries
with low imitative ability and small markets. But establishing these outcomes has
often relied on classifying countries into imitative ability or market size cohorts on a
subjective basis, without being able to determine the sensitivity of the outcomes to
the classification.
As has become standard, we use a variant of the gravity equation to examine the
impact of IPR protection on trade, but otherwise our approach differs from most
previous examinations in several respects. First, we employ panel data rather than
the more usual cross-section data, thus allowing us to control for unobserved
heterogeneity both across countries and time. We also consider a wider range of
advanced exporters than is usual in the literature. Second, we use an alternative
measure of imitative ability (schooling) and explicitly consider the interactions
between imitative ability and market size. Third, and most significantly, rather than
splitting our observations into different regimes in a subjective manner or making
certain assumptions about the form of such interactions (i.e. a linear interaction
term), we use threshold regression techniques to estimate both the number of
regimes and their positioning.
Our empirical outcomes are summarised in Table 9, and from these we draw the
following general conclusions. First, we find statistically significant thresholds for
all threshold variables and all industries, indicating that there is a non-linear
relationship between trade flows and IPRs. Second the results for Total Manufac-
turing mirror the characteristics of one industry in particular—Fabricated Metal
Products. Since these products form nearly 60% of manufactured exports from these
five countries this is perhaps unsurprising, but certainly it would be well to keep in
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mind that the aggregate is not representative of the individual industries. Third,
while there is only limited evidence of market power effects, where they do occur it
is below the relevant threshold. So although market power effects are far from
pervasive, they should not be totally discounted for the least developed, small
countries with low imitative ability and weak IPRs. Finally, market expansion
effects are prevalent and, with few exceptions, either occur in all regimes or above a
relevant threshold.
The examination of combined thresholds on imitative ability and the level of
IPRs was directly comparable to the results based on subjective thresholds in the
literature. Allowing thresholds to vary across industries brought the patterns
previously identified into sharper focus. For countries with low imitative abilities,
strengthening low IPRs will lead to market expansion effects for most industries, but
market power effects for some. But for each industry (except Food) there is a ceiling
beyond which strengthening IPRs will have no significant effect on trade flows. For
countries with high imitative abilities we found a clear separation of industries.
Those which exhibit market power effects when imitative ability is low show no
significant effects from strengthening IPRs when imitative ability is high. Those
which exhibit market expansion effects when imitative ability is low, exhibit market
expansion effects when imitative ability is high.
The latter results draw attention to the different behaviour of industries and
illustrate why it is useful to look beyond Total Manufacturing exports. The two-digit
Table 9 Summary of threshold regression results
Number of
thresholds
Market power effects Market expansion effects
Single
threshold
Dual thresholds Single
threshold
Dual thresholds
Market
size
IPR Market
size
IPR
Y S (H) M Y S (H) M Sm Lge Low Hi Y S (H) M Sm Lge Low Hi
Man 3 1 (1) 2 B A E (E) A A A E A
Fab 3 1 (1) 2 B A E (E) A A E E A
Chem 2 1 (0) 1 B A E (E) B E A
Non-
Met
2 2 (1) 2 A A (E) A A A E A
Other 2 1 (1) 1 B A A (A) B A A
Basic 2 3 (1) 2 A A, B (E) A A E
Food 3 3 (2) 3 A E (E) A E E E E
Paper 2 2 (0) 1 A A (E) E E A E A
Text 2 3 (1) 1 B A A (A) A E A E A
Wood 2 1 (2) 2 B A A (A, B) A,B E
Thresholds: Y GDP per capita; S, H secondary and tertiary schooling, respectively; M market size.
Effects: A Blank entry indicates no significant effect (market power or market expansion as appropriate)
found. Single thresholds: A, B effects found only above or below a threshold, respectively; E effects found
in all cases. Dual thresholds: A, B effects found only when imitative ability is above or below its
threshold, respectively; E effects found at both imitative ability levels
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industries present a range of outcomes, and strengthening IPRs is likely to change
not only the volume but also the composition of imports from these advanced
countries, although not necessarily in favour of the more R&D intensive industries.
The broad shifts in the composition are largely independent of the level of imitative
ability.
If, as the literature suggests, increased Manufacturing trade with advanced
countries brings technology diffusion, then our results indicate that most developing
countries can anticipate increased technology flows as their IPRs are strengthened.
The small and least developed may see little such benefits, however. For them
technology diffusion may have to depend on other channels. Consideration of how
IPRs affect these other channels and, in particular, how they affect exporting firms’
choice of market access is an important element of future research in this area.
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Appendix 1: threshold regressions
Threshold regression addresses the issue of whether regression functions are
identical across observations or whether there exists evidence of non-linearity with
observations split into discrete classes. Hansen (1996, 2000) developed a method of
estimating such thresholds and testing for their significance as well as constructing
confidence intervals. Hansen (1999) extended this approach to fixed effects panel
data. In this appendix we briefly describe the methods used in this paper.
The method can be described using the following two variable panel regression
model
yit ¼ li þ d1xitIðqit  kÞ þ d2xitIðqit [ kÞ þ eit ðA1Þ
where I() is the indicator function and qit is the threshold variable.23 Here the
observations are divided into two regimes depending upon whether the threshold
variable, qit, is smaller or larger than the threshold, k. The coefficient on xit is given
by d1 for observations with qit less than or equal to k and by d2 for qit greater than k.
Chan (1993) and Hansen (1999, 2000) recommend estimation of k by least squares,
which involves finding the value of k that minimises the concentrated sum of
squared errors, S1, that is k^ ¼ arg mink S1ðkÞ. In practice this involves searching
over distinct values of qit for the value of k at which the concentrated sum of squares
is smallest. Hansen (1999) notes that it is undesirable to have two few observations
in a particular regime, a possibility that can be excluded by constraining the possible
values of k to those for which a minimum percentage of observations are in each
regime. In our analysis we impose the restriction that at least 20% of observations
must lie in each regime.
Hansen (1999) suggests the following steps to estimate the threshold value: first,
sort the distinct values of the observations on the threshold variable, qit. Second,
23 To estimate this equation by least squares Hansen (1999) recommends a fixed effects transformation to
remove the individual-specific mean.
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eliminate the smallest and largest g percent. For each of the remaining values of qit
estimate Eq. A1 and save the sum of squared residuals. Third, choose the estimate of
k^ as the value of qit with the minimum sum of squared errors.
Having found a threshold it is important to determine whether it is statistically
significant or not, that is, it is necessary to test the null hypothesis H0: d1 = d2.
Given that the threshold is not identified under the null hypothesis this test has a
non-standard distribution and critical values cannot be read off standard distribution
tables. Hansen (1999) proposes a bootstrap procedure to simulate the asymptotic
distribution of the likelihood ratio test. This involves the following steps: first,
estimate the linear model where no threshold is assumed and save the sum of
squared residuals, S0. Second, calculate the likelihood ratio test of the null
hypothesis, H0, given by F1  ½S0  S1ðkÞ=r^2; where r^2 ¼ 1=n½t  1f gS1ðk^Þ; with
n the number of cross-sectional units and t the number of time periods. Third,
construct a bootstrapped sample under the null hypothesis by drawing from the
normal distribution of the residuals from the linear model.24 Fourth, using the
bootstrap sample estimate the model under the null (linearity) and the alternative
(threshold at k^) and calculate the bootstrap likelihood ratio statistic, F1. Finally,
repeat this procedure a large number of times (in our case 1,000) and calculate the
percentage of draws for which the simulated statistic exceeds the actual one. This is
the bootstrap estimate of the p-value for F1 under H0.
In the dual-threshold model we have
yit ¼ li þ d1xitIðqit  k1Þ þ d2xitIðk1\qit  k2Þ þ d3xitIðqit [ k2Þ þ eit ðA2Þ
where the two thresholds are ordered such that k1 \ k2. It is a straightforward
extension to search for the values of k1 and k2 that minimise the sum of squared
errors. At the same time it can be expensive in terms of computation time to search
for both thresholds simultaneously. Chong (1994), Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron
(1998) have shown however that sequential estimation is consistent. This involves
fixing the first threshold at k^1 and searching for a second threshold assuming that the
first is fixed. The search takes place for values of qit both above and below the first
threshold, though the method can be adapted to ensure that a minimum of g per cent
of observations are in each of the three regimes. It can be shown that the estimate of
the second threshold, k^2, is asymptotically efficient using this method. This is not
the case for k^1 however, because it was estimated from a sum of squared errors
function that was contaminated by the presence of a neglected regime. To overcome
this problem Bai (1997) recommends a refinement estimator for k^1 that involves
fixing the second threshold at k^2 and searching for the first threshold again, now
including the second threshold. This approach can be extended to consider the
possibility of more than two thresholds.
In Sect. 4.3 we investigate the possibility of thresholds on more than one
variable. Specifically, we examine interactions between the level of imitative ability
and both the level of IPRs and market size. To allow such a possibility we adopt an
approach similar to that described in the previous paragraph. We begin by fixing the
24 Given the panel nature of the problem Hansen (1999) recommends grouping the residuals by
individual and drawing (with replacement) a sample of size n in order to construct the bootstrap series.
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threshold on our measure of imitative ability. In particular, we fix the threshold at
the highest significant threshold on imitative ability and then search for a threshold
on the other variable in the high imitative ability regime (i.e. for observations for
which the measure of imitative ability is above the estimated threshold). Finally we
consider the possibility of a threshold on these variables in the low imitative ability
regime. Where the second threshold, that is the threshold in the high imitative
ability regime, is significant we include it when searching for a third threshold. But
then the estimated thresholds in the high imitative ability regime are not
asymptotically efficient, since they were estimated from a sum of squared errors
function contaminated by the presence of a neglected regime. To deal with this we
follow Bai (1997) and re-estimate the high imitative ability threshold now including
the estimated threshold in the low imitative ability regime.
Appendix 2: data
Our data is averaged over six 5-year periods, 1970–1974, 1975–1979, 1980–1984,
1985–1989, 1990–1994 and 1995–1999. Due to missing data for various variables
the maximum number of observations is 2021. The data for population, GDP and
GDP per capita came from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2001)
database. Data on distance, common language and borders and landlockedness came
from a website maintained by Jon Haveman. Trade data came from the OECD’s
International Trade by Commodity Statistic (Historical Series, 1961–1990) and
International Trade by Commodity Statistic (1990–1999). The trade data from 1961
to 1990 was in SITC rev. 2 and was converted to ISIC rev. 2 using a concordance
supplied by the OECD. The data for the period 1990–1999 was in SITC rev. 3 and
was converted to SITC rev. 2 and then ISIC rev. 2 again using a concordance
supplied by the OECD. The education data was taken from the Barro and Lee
(2001) database. The index of IPR protection is provided in Ginarte and Park (1997)
and is the most commonly used indicator of IPR protection. This index was
Table 10 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
3—Total Manufacturing 19.10 2.13 4.61 25.58
31—Food, Beverages and Tobacco 16.73 2.52 4.61 22.28
32—Textiles, Apparel and Leather 15.46 2.48 4.61 22.18
33—Wood Products and Furniture 12.78 3.05 4.61 21.68
34—Paper, Paper Products and Printing 14.79 2.65 4.61 22.38
35—Chemical Products 17.20 2.33 4.61 23.64
36—Non-Metallic Mineral Products 14.50 2.43 4.61 21.28
37—Basic Metal Industries 15.81 2.56 4.61 22.30
38—Fabricated Metal Products 18.51 2.18 9.36 25.19
39—Other Manufacturing 14.21 2.62 4.61 21.57
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constructed for 110 countries quinquennially for the period 1960–1990. Five
characteristics of patent laws are included: extent of coverage; membership in
international patent agreements; provisions for loss of protection; enforcement
mechanisms and duration of protection. Each was assigned a value ranging from
zero to one and their unweighted sums formed the index, with a higher number
signalling stronger IPR protection. This data has been updated to 1995 by Park who
kindly supplied us with the full set of data. Table 10 provides summary statistics for
all the variables.
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